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Abstract
Whilst the fundamental laws of physics are time-reversal invariant, most macro-
scopic processes are irreversible. Given that the fundamental laws are taken to
underpin all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be recon-
ciled with the asymmetry manifest elsewhere?
In statistical mechanics, progress can be made with this question; what I dub
the Zwanzig-Zeh-Wallace framework can be used to construct the irreversible equa-
tions of statistical mechanics from the underlying microdynamics. Yet this frame-
work uses coarse-graining, a procedure that has faced much criticism.
I focus on two objections in the literature: claims that coarse-graining makes
time-asymmetry (i) ‘illusory’ and (ii) ‘anthropocentric’. I argue that these objec-
tions arise from an unsatisfactory justification of coarse-graining prevalent in the
literature, rather than from coarse-graining itself. This justification relies on the
idea of measurement imprecision.
By considering the role that abstraction and autonomy play, I provide an alter-
native justification and offer replies to the illusory and anthropocentric objections.
Finally I consider the broader consequences of this alternative justification: the
connection to debates about inter-theoretic reduction and further, the implication
that the time-asymmetry in statistical mechanics is weakly emergent.
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1 Introduction
Many processes occur in only one direction of time. People age, buildings crumble, eggs
smash and gases spontaneously expand — towards the future. Rewinding a film of such
processes displays an unphysical sequence of events: eggs cannot unsmash and people
cannot become younger. A more technical way of describing the ‘directedness’ of such
processes is to say that the laws governing these processes are not time-reversal invariant
(TRI). That is, the time-reversal operator T does not send solutions of the equations —
i.e. histories of the systems at issue — to solutions. (The time-reversal operator varies
across theories, but here I take T to be the map t 7→ −t.)
In stark contrast, the laws of fundamental physics are TRI.1 The two sequences of events
displayed by a film playing forwards, and in rewind, are both physical possibilities. That
is, they are both solutions to the laws of fundamental physics. This leads to a traditional
problem: given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin all other processes,
how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the asymmetry manifest
elsewhere?
1Well almost: the relevant symmetry is the CPT-invariance. But the failure of TR-invariance in
subatomic physics doesn’t underpin the asymmetries discussed here. For the subtleties of TRI, cf. e.g.
Roberts (2013, 2017).
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It is not only the processes of our everyday experience that are irreversible; many equa-
tions within physics are also irreversible. In particular, many equations in statistical
physics are irreversible, such as the Boltzmann equation, the Langevin equation, the
Pauli master equation...the list goes on.
But within statistical mechanics (SM), much progress has been made with this tra-
ditional problem. The irreversible behaviour exhibited in non-equilibrium SM can be
described by equations collectively called ‘master equations’, which give ‘a purposefully
incomplete account of the conservative evolution of some underlying microscopic sys-
tems’ (Liu and Emch, 2002, p. 479). This paper focuses on one framework, originating
in the work of Zwanzig (1960). The idea is that the irreversible equations of SM can be
constructed from the reversible equations (of either classical or quantum mechanics). I
will dub this the ‘Zwanzig-Zeh-Wallace’ (ZZW) framework, since Zeh and Wallace are
prominent later authors who have developed this framework.
However, this framework depends upon the procedure of coarse-graining, which has been
heavily criticised. Redhead describes coarse-graining as “one of the most deceitful arti-
fices I have ever come across in theoretical physics” (Redhead, 1996, p. 31) as quoted
in (Uffink, 2010, p. 197). Amongst the list of accusations against coarse-graining are:
protests of empirical inadequacy, subjectivity and incompatibility with scientific real-
ism. So, if this construction method is to solve the puzzle of time-asymmetry in SM,
a justification for coarse-graining is needed. The project of this paper is to give such a
justification.
1.1 Prospectus
I will answer two objections to coarse-graining in statistical mechanics. In Section
2, I expound the ZZW framework and in Section 3, I consider why this framework
works. Then I discuss two objections to coarse-graining, namely that the asymmetry
resulting from coarse-graining is illusory and/or anthropocentric. Section 4.1 outlines
these two objections in detail. Section 4.2 describes the most prevalent —and I argue
unsatisfactory— justification of coarse-graining in the literature, the measurement im-
precision justification, which lies behind these objections. In Section 5, I outline my
alternative justification of coarse-graining which can answer the two objections: these
answers are given in Section 6 and 7 respectively. In Section 8, I draw some broader
consequences from this alternative justification: the coarse-grained asymmetry is weakly
emergent.
2 The ZZW framework
The ZZW framework provides a recipe for constructing irreversible dynamics from the
underlying reversible dynamics. This framework works with both quantum and classical
mechanics (Zwanzig, 1961), although I mainly discuss the classical case. It is clearest to
see the framework as constructing an irreversible equation in three stages. First: move to
the ensemble variant of the underlying microdynamics. Second: pick a coarse-graining
projection Pˆ , whose nature will be described below. Third: two moves are required to
find an irreversible and autonomous equation for the coarse-grained probability density.
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Stage 1: In classical SM, the state of an individual system is represented by a point in
a phase space, Γ-space. (For N particles without internal degrees of freedom, Γ-space is
6N -dimensional). The system’s evolution is determined by Hamilton’s equations. How-
ever, there is also an ensemble variant of this description. Here probability densities over
Γ-space, ρ, evolve according to Liouville’s equation, which, like Hamilton’s equations, is
TRI.2
Stage 2: The concept of coarse-graining was originally introduced in a specific form
by Gibbs (1903) which I first recall, before describing the generalised coarse-graining
projections used by the ZZW framework.
Gibbs proposes that the accessible phase-space Γ is partitioned into small, finite volume
elements ∆Vm. The coarse-grained density ρcg(q, p) is then defined by averaging the
original probability density ρ(q, p) in each of these boxes. So coarse-graining throws
away the information about how exactly the ensemble is distributed across each box.
Gibbs describes the evolution of the probability density by analogy with an ink drop.
Dropping blue ink into a glass of water results in the whole glass appearing light blue.
However, a drop of ink is an incompressible fluid and so its volume is constant. Upon
examination under a microscope, we would see the drop of ink has just fibrillated into
thin filaments across the whole glass: cf. Figure 1. So Gibbs’ idea is that like an
incompressible fluid, ρ often fibrillates over the accessible phase space, as it evolves
under the Liouvillean dynamics.
But because ρ behaves like an incompressible fluid, its volume is constant despite its
fibrillation; and hence its Gibbs fine-grained entropy, Sfg = −kB
∫
Γ
ρ ln ρd3Nqd3Np where
kB denotes Boltzmann’s constant, is constant. Traditionally, this has been considered
problematic, as the thermodynamic entropy increases. However, in a coarse-grained
description, the density spreads smoothly throughout the available space, and this is
well modelled by the coarse-grained probability density, ρcg. This density has a different
entropy, the Gibbs coarse-grained entropy,
Scg = −kB
∫
Γ
ρcg ln ρcgd
3Nqd3Np. (1)
Unlike its fine-grained counterpart, Scg can increase.
Again, the ink analogy illuminates the discussion of time-evolution. From a macroscopic
perspective, the ink smoothly spreads throughout the glass. In the SM case, this ‘smooth
spreading’ of the coarse-grained density ρcg is described by a ‘coarse-grained dynamics’,
defined as follows. ρcg evolves forward according to the usual Liouvillean dynamics for a
small time interval ∆t; and then it is coarse-grained; and this two-step process is iterated.
This gives what Wallace (2011) terms the coarse-grained forward (C+) dynamics (a label
I henceforth adopt).
Note, however, that we could equally well have defined the coarse-grained backwards
(C−) dynamics according to which ρcg is evolved backwards for ∆t by the Liouvillean
dynamics; and then coarse-grained, then evolved backwards again; and so on. However,
this C− dynamics describes anti-thermodynamic trajectories (where entropy increases
2Throughout this paper I leave the interpretation of such probability densities open; but admittedly,
their connection to the behaviour of individual systems is an urgent issue in the philosophy of SM (see
e.g. (Sklar, 1993, ch.3)).
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Figure 1: A drop of ink in a glass of water fibrillates throughout the whole volume, making the water
look black on a coarse-grained level (pictured on the right hand side). Likewise, a probability density
initially concentrated in one corner fibrillates across the available phase space (Sklar, 1993).
into the past) and so is “empirically disastrous”. The extent to which the success of the
coarse-grained forwards, but not backwards, dynamics can be explained (in particular
by appealing to cosmological considerations, such as postulating a ‘Past Hypothesis’)
is controversial (see Earman (2006); Wallace (2011); Albert (2000, Ch. 4)). But in this
paper, it will suffice to admit that the asymmetry has been added in here ‘by hand’
and thus that this project does not involve locating the ‘ultimate source’ of the time-
asymmetry. For as announced in Section 1, I aim only to defend coarse-graining from
various objections.
So far, I have only described Gibbs’ original coarse-graining. But in the ZZW framework,
a more general notion of coarse-graining is used. A coarse-graining projection, Pˆ , acts
on the space of possible probability density functions.3 The important function of Pˆ is
to split ρ into a relevant part ρr and an irrelevant part ρir.
Pˆ ρ =: ρr, (1− Pˆ )ρ =: ρir so that ρ = ρr + ρir. (2)
Here are three examples of a coarse-graining projection Pˆ defining a relevant density ρr.
In these examples, the density is defined over a reduced number of degrees of freedom of
the systems. Hence we speak of relevant degrees of freedom, as well as relevant densities.
1. The archetypal Gibbsian coarse-graining discussed above can be written as a pro-
jection, Pˆcg. Pˆcg averages over small, finite volume elements ∆Vm (m = 1, 2...)
which cover the 6N -dimensional phase space Γ. These volume elements ∆Vm are
sometimes referred to as ‘coarse-grained boxes’ or ‘cells of a partition’. (I write
‘∆Vm’ both for the region, and its volume.) Thus for (q, p) ∈ ∆Vm, i.e. the mth
cell, we have
Pˆcgρ(q, p) := ρcg(q, p) :=
1
∆Vm
∫
∆Vm
ρ(q′, p′)dq′dp′ =:
ρm
∆Vm
, (3)
3Pˆ is idempotent: Pˆ 2 = Pˆ . Pˆ is usually linear and time-independent and so commutes with ∂∂t .
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so that for a general (q, p) we sum over the cells with characteristic functions
Pˆcgρ(q, p) := ρcg(q, p) :=
∑
m
χ
∆Vm
(q, p).
ρm
∆Vm
(4)
The action of Pˆcg is to smooth the density ρ to be uniform across each box, whilst
leaving the probability of being in any single box invariant; for all m,
∫
∆Vm
Pˆcgρ =∫
∆Vm
ρ.
2. Correlations between particles are discarded by appropriate integration, i.e. by
taking a marginal distribution. And this can be thought of as applying a projection
Pˆµ. This projection takes you from a probability density on the full phase space, Γ-
space (6N -dimensional for N point particles), to the one-particle marginal density,
which describes the probability that particle i will be at a particular point in (6-
dimensional) µ-space, i.e. have a given (~q, ~p) ∈ R6. Thus, the mapping from
Γ-space densities to µ-space densities destroys information about the correlations
between different particles and cannot be inverted.
More generally, in the BBGKY hierarchy we define a system of correlation func-
tions, where fs gives the probability that s particles have a given position and
momenta. Generally the evolution of fs depends on fs+1, and fs+1 depends on
fs+2... all the way to fN (where N is the totally number of particles). But —
under certain physical conditions— this chain of equations can be truncated at
a given point, i.e. all correlations beyond the three-particle correlations can be
thrown away (Huang, 1987, p. 65).
A projection akin to Pˆµ is used in constructing the Boltzmann equation (see
(Wallace, 2015, p. 292)(Zeh, 2007, p. 59) and, for an explicit construction of the
Prigogine-Brout equation - a cousin of the Boltzmann equation - see (Zwanzig,
1960, p. 1340)).
3. The diagonalisation projection Pˆdia applies to quantum systems and removes off-
diagonal elements of the density matrix (with respect to some chosen basis). This
partitioning into diagonal and off-diagonal matrix-elements (relevant and irrelevant
respectively) is used in the derivation of the Pauli master equation (Zwanzig,
1960, p. 1339), where discarding the off-diagonal elements amounts to ignoring
interference terms.
Given a coarse-graining projection Pˆ , the next aim is to find an equation for just the
relevant degrees of freedom described by ρr. By re-arranging the Liouville equation in
terms of the two densities, ρr and ρir, we find the pre-master equation (see (Zwanzig,
1960, §2) for the steps to the pre-master equation);
∂ρr(t)
∂t
= Fˆ ρir(t0) +
∫ t
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′), (5)
where Fˆ := PˆLe−it(1−Pˆ )L and Gˆ(t′) := PˆLeit
′(1−Pˆ )L(1−Pˆ )L. L represents the Liouvillean
evolution.
This pre-master equation is formally exact and so the time-reversibility remains. The
first term on the RHS depends on the irrelevant degrees of freedom, ρir. The second
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term is non-Markovian; the evolution of ρr at t depends on the history of the system
between t0 and t as evidenced by the integral between t
′ = t0 and t. This is unlike
classical mechanical trajectories for which, given the current state, the future evolution
is determined without any information about the system’s history.
Stage 3: Next, two assumptions are used to arrive at an autonomous and irreversible
equation for the relevant degrees of freedom. ‘Autonomy’ requires that the dynamical
evolution of ρr has no explicit dependence on ρir or t.
4 The reversible pre-master equa-
tion (5) is of the form ∂ρr(t)
∂t
= f(ρr(t), ρir(t), t) and so is not a time-independent or
autonomous equation.
In general, an autonomous dynamics for ρr is in no way guaranteed; since ρ can be
decomposed any way we like, the aspects of ρ we have dubbed ‘relevant’ (ρr) need not
be dynamically autonomous or independent from the irrelevant aspects. Two steps are
required:
1. The initial state assumption states that the first term vanishes. This is
achieved by stipulating that ρir(t0) = 0.
5 When ρir(t0) = 0, equation (5) be-
comes a closed equation for ρr(t).
2. The Markovian approximation requires that Gˆ(t′) decreases to zero over a
certain timescale, the ‘relaxation time’, τ . Thus, for times t′ greater than the
relaxation time τ , Gˆ(t′) = 0. Furthermore, it requires that ρr does not vary much
over this timescale τ , and so Gˆ(t′) drops off more rapidly than the timescales over
which ρr evolves. To sum up: the key physical idea of the Markovian approximation
is that there is a relaxation time τ over which the integral kernel drops off and
over which ρr does not vary much (Wallace, 2015, p. 292).
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4The condition for an equation to be autonomous, familiar from mathematics, is that “t does not
occur explicitly in the equation, as in dydt = f(y)” (Robinson, 2004, p. 13). This is required so that
∂ρr(t)
∂t has no ‘covert dependence’ on ρir.
5This is a sufficient but not necessary condition for this term to vanish; the action of PˆLe−it(1−Pˆ )L
on a non-zero ρir(0) could also be such that the term disappears.
6This general assumption of ‘different timescales’ is of course used much more widely than just in
the ZZW framework. For example, in Reif (2009, Ch. 14) the derivation of the Boltzmann equation
requires a similar assumption: that f(~r,~v, t) does not vary appreciably during time intervals of the
order of the collision time, nor over spatial intervals of the order of intermolecular forces.
I now offer an intuitive explanation of the general situation, by extending Zeh’s discussion using a
metaphor of a forest. Within the irrelevant information, Zeh (2007, p. 65) distinguishes the ‘doorway’
from ‘deep states’, which are in different ‘channels’. So there are three ‘channels’: (A) ‘relevant’,
(B) ‘doorway’, (C) ‘deep’ — and these are analogous to (A) a clearing in a wood, (B) the sunny
woodland surrounding the clearing, (C) the dark woods. Zeh gives the following example: (A) is a one-
particle marginal density, (B) encodes two-particle correlations and (C) encodes three-or-more particle
correlations (cf. the BBGKY hierarchy). Now, the non-Markovian term in the pre-master equations
gives the contributions to ∂ρr(t)∂t at t from the part of ρr that became irrelevant at t− t′ and remained
irrelevant until time t: at which point it becomes relevant again.
This ‘information becoming irrelevant’ is like people in the clearing (A) wandering into the sunny
woodland (B). Thus, the relaxation time τ is the time taken for the people who arrived in the sunny
woodland (B) to wander either back to the clearing (A) or into the dark woods (C). The key assumption
is that once in the dark woods (C), no one can find their way back to the clearing (A) again. In less
picturesque terms: the three-or-more particle correlations are not dynamically relevant for the one-
particle marginal density.
This metaphor also encompasses the famous recurrence theorem. If you wander around a (finite)
woodland for an incredibly long (i.e. recurrence) time, you will eventually find your way back to the
clearing. As I will discuss in Section 3.1, on recurrence timescales the ‘deeply’ irrelevant states (C), e.g.
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Provided that these physical features hold, then the following mathematical moves
can be made:
(a) If the integral upper limit t is greater than τ extending the integration interval
to ∞ makes no difference to the value of the integral; ∫∞
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′) '∫ t
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′).
(b) If ρr varies very slowly over τ , ρr(t − t′) ≈ ρr(t) for t′ < τ . (If t′ > τ this
approximation does not hold, but since ρr(t− t′) is multiplied by Gˆ(t′) which
is ≈ 0 for t′ > τ , we can replace ρr(t− t′) by ρr(t).)
(c) Thus, if the Markovian approximation holds, we can replace the second term∫ t
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t− t′) of equation (5) by
∫∞
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′)ρr(t).
Provided that the initial state assumption and the Markovian approximation hold, we
thus arrive at an autonomous equation —the master equation— for the relevant degrees
of freedom, ρr:
∂ρr(t)
∂t
≈ Dˆρr(t), (6)
where Dˆ :=
∫∞
t0
dt′Gˆ(t′).
This completes Stage 3. For our purposes, there are three comments to make.
(1) This schematic equation (6) has specific forms for specific systems (Penrose, 1979,
p. 1986); “various particular cases of it include the (empirically verified) equations of
decoherence, of radioactive decay, and of diffusion and equilibration in dilute gases”
(Wallace, 2015, p. 292).
(2) We can now describe the irreversible behaviour using a generalised version of the
Gibbs coarse-grained entropy. The coarse-grained Gibbs entropy Scg (in equation 1) can
be written as a functional of ρ and Pˆcg:
Scg[Pˆ ; ρ] = −kB
∫
Pˆcgρ(q, p) ln Pˆcgρ(q, p)d
3Nqd3Np. (7)
And similarly more generally: we define, for any ZZW projection Pˆ , obeying equations
(5) and (6), the entropy:
S[ρr] := S[Pˆ ; ρ] := −kB
∫
Pˆ ρ(q, p) ln Pˆ ρ(q, p)d3Nqd3Np. (8)
This quantity can increase — like Scg, as noted after equation (1). Thus Zeh writes: “if
Pˆ only destroys information, the master equation describes never-decreasing entropy”
(Zeh, 2007, p. 65):
dS[ρr]
dt
≥ 0. (9)
For a proof, see Tolman (1938, p. 171), Huang (1987, p. 74), Reif (2009, p. 624) and
for the quantum context, see Landsberg (1990, p. 145).
(3) Finally, and most importantly for our interests: this closed equation 6 is irreversible
(Zwanzig, 1960, p. 1340).
three-or-more particle correlations, become relevant (A) again.
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3 Why does this method work?
Why does the ZZW framework lead to empirically successful equations? This success is
surprising because, after all, the coarse-graining projection (and the ensuing C+ dynam-
ics) cannot be implemented by the “official” microdynamics. Given Liouville’s theorem,
the microdynamics of the closed system cannot really cause the velocity correlations
to be erased (in the case of the Boltzmann equation), or really delete the off-diagonal
density matrix elements (in the case of the Pauli master equation). In short: the TRI
microdynamics of the closed system cannot dynamically implement the coarse-graining
projection.
In order to explain the success of irreversible equations in SM there have been three
broad strategies:
• (1) Interventionists, e.g. Bergmann and Lebowitz (1955); Blatt (1959); Ridderbos
and Redhead (1998), argue that perturbations from the environment cannot be
neglected. Thus, the system cannot be treated as closed. (In the ZZW terminology,
the environment dynamically implements the projection, so that ρr, rather than
ρ, is the correct description of the subsystem.)
• (2) Others advocate changing the underlying microdynamics so that the coarse-
graining projection is dynamically implemented. Albert (2000) and Prigogine and
Stengers (1984) advocate non-TRI microdynamics in the quantum and classical
case respectively. (In the ZZW terminology, the non-TRI dynamics yields ρ 7→ ρr.)
• (3) Some, such as Wallace (2012), propose that under special conditions the ir-
reversible SM dynamics will give the same density over the relevant degrees of
freedom as the microdynamics.
For the remainder of the paper, I only focus on the third of these strategies, which I call
‘the special conditions’ account. In Section 3.1, I consider this account and the required
‘meshing’ condition. Section 3.2 considers when a density satisfies this condition and
reports Wallace’s proposal. This will lead into the idea of a ‘Past Hypothesis’; (although,
as mentioned in Stage 2 of Section 2, an in-depth discussion of the controversial Past
Hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper).
3.1 The special conditions account
The third strategy claims that under certain conditions the microdynamics will induce
the same probabilities for the relevant degrees of freedom, as the C+ coarse-grained
dynamics governing ρr. On this view, the generalised coarse-graining projection is not
dynamically implemented. Thus, ρ and ρr are two distinct densities.
How do we find ρr at a given time T? There are two “routes”. As discussed in Section
2, the C+ dynamics for a period t0 < t < T is defined by evolving the density by the
microdynamics Uˆ for a very short time ∆t, then applying the projection Pˆ , then evolving
under Uˆ for ∆t, then Pˆ ... etc. This means that irrelevant details are thrown away at
every step. In contrast, the Liouvillean microdynamics Uˆ evolves the full density ρ for
the period t0 < t < T ; and then one finds the relevant part of the density by applying Pˆ
at T ; so on this “route”, coarse-graining occurs only once at the end of the time-period.
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Thus, the condition that these two different dynamics give the same density ρr(T ) can
be expressed by the diagram in Figure 2 commuting.
Figure 2: ρ and Pˆ are forwards-compatible if the two routes to ρr(t) give the same answer.
Following the terminology suggested by Wallace (2011), let us call those states ρ for
which diagram 2 commutes forwards compatible with coarse-graining Pˆ . So forwards
compatibility means that it does not matter whether you coarse-grain at every time step
∆t or just once, at the end. Note that forwards compatibility is relative to a particular
choice of coarse graining Pˆ . Thus this is a condition of ‘harmony’ between the evolution
of ρ and the coarse graining Pˆ . For example, had the size of the coarse-graining boxes
∆Vm averaged over in Gibbs’ original example been chosen to be very large, then ρ might
well not be forwards-compatible with this coarse-graining, Pˆcg. In the wider literature
on inter-theoretic relations, such a forwards-compatible scenario is sometimes described
as ‘meshing’ dynamics (e.g. Butterfield (2012), List (2016)).
However, we cannot expect harmony to “reign supreme”. Not all densities ρ will sat-
isfy Figure 2’s meshing condition: Loschmidt’s reversibility objection vividly reminds
us that if we were to reverse the momenta of the components of a fibrillating ink
drop, it would coalesce back in a manner incompatible with the ‘smooth-spreading
out’ coarse-grained dynamics. (More specifically: the time-reverse of a density ρ ini-
tially forwards-compatible and on a trajectory of increasing entropy will not itself be
forwards-compatible.)
And due to Poincare´’s recurrence theorem, nor will any ρ satisfy the meshing condition
for all time. (More specifically: in the ZZW framework, recurrence implies that the
integral kernel Gˆ in equation (5) must increase again so that at the recurrence time
it has returned to its original value. Therefore the upper limit of the integral in the
Markovian approximation strictly cannot be taken to ∞, but at most to some large —
but sub-recurrent — time T . Consequently, the Markovian approximation is only valid
for sub-recurrent times.)
3.2 When is a density forwards-compatible?
Characterising those densities ρ which are forwards-compatible is a harder job than
ruling out candidate densities. A density ρ will be forwards-compatible provided that
the density ρir (and the details such as correlations encoded in it) that are thrown away
by Pˆ do not matter for the forwards-evolution of ρr. One clear case where this is not true
is Hahn’s spin-echo experiment (Hahn, 1950). The application of a radio-frequency pulse
causes dephased spins (precessing in a magnetic field) to realign and thus emit an ‘echo’
signal (for a recent philosophical discussion see Frigg (2010, §3.5.1)). The correlations
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— that are ignored from the coarse-graining perspective — are crucial for the later ‘echo
signal’. Indeed, the spin-echo experiment has been described as a ‘Loschmidt demon’
which reverses the velocities v 7→ −v.7
Given the above discussion of the Loschmidt reversibility objection, here too the density
ρ is clearly not forwards-compatible. Consequently, the spin-echo is not a surprising
counterexample to the coarse-graining framework — which we can only expect to be
successful when Figure 2 commutes: i.e. when the information (in this case, correlations)
thrown away by the coarse-graining projection Pˆ are not crucial — unlike the spin-echo
case.
Ridderbos and Redhead (1998, p. 1237) and Blatt (1959, p. 749) generalise from the
spin-echo case to reject the coarse-graining framework altogether.8 However, rather than
claiming that the spin-echo case reveals coarse-graining to be empirically inadequate, it
seems fairer to say the density ρ is patently not forwards-compatible and so we do not
expect coarse-graining methods to apply.9
Naturally, the following question arises: why should we expect the spin-echo (‘correlations-
are-crucial’) type of case to be the exception rather than the rule? To this, the reply
can only be that ‘nature is kind’: often — i.e. in the irreversible equations of SM — ρir
is irrelevant for the evolution of ρr.
Nonetheless, one might ask: what informative condition can be used to pick out the
forwards-compatible scenarios? Since the presence of ‘crucial correlations’ was the prob-
lem in the spin-echo case, perhaps removing them is the answer: ensuring there is no
irrelevant information at all is one way to avoid the failure of compatibility. Indeed, this
is what the initial state assumption ρir(t0) = 0 in Section 2 achieved — and alongside
the Markovian approximation, this was used to construct the C+ dynamics. In similar
vein, Wallace stipulates that ‘Simple’ initial densities ρ will not have crucial conspira-
torial correlations encoded in their irrelevant degrees of freedom; he defines “a Simple
distribution as any distribution specifiable in a closed form in a simple way without
specifying it as the time evolution of some other distribution” (Wallace, 2011, p. 19).10
Note, however, that such a condition — the initial state assumption or Wallace’s Simplic-
ity condition — can only be applied once.11 The initial state A in Figure 1 — confined
to four Gibbsian cells, or, in the analogy, the ink drop’s initial state — is Simple (or
equivalently it satisfies the ZZW initial state assumption). However, it then fibrillates
over the available phase space and thus is no longer Simple. Whilst initially at t0 there
7More accurately, the spin’s velocities are unaltered, but the order of the spins is altered by reflection
in the x-z plane. However, “the grain of truth in the standard story is that a reversal of the ordering
with unaltered velocities is in a sense ‘isomorphic’ to a velocity reversal with unaltered ordering” (Frigg,
2010, p. 64).
8Blatt concludes that “it is not permissible to base fundamental arguments in statistical mechanics
on coarse-graining” (Blatt, 1959, p. 749).
9Lavis (2004, p. 686) further defends coarse-graining.
10One might object that this definition is vague. Instead consider this ‘Simplicity’ condition as: an
overarching condition to capture what is similar across those densities which satisfy the initial state
assumption for different Pˆ s. A given ρ satisfying the initial state assumption at t0 will ensure that –
with respect to a given Pˆ and thus a given definition of ‘irrelevant’ — ρ is ‘Simple’ at t0. But of course
there are many densities that count as ‘Simple’ in some sense, but not in the respect required for the
initial state assumption (ρir(t0) = 0) for a particular Pˆ .
11Wallace points out that it would be excessive to apply it more than once: the microdynamics are
deterministic and so fixing ρ at one time fixes ρ for all times.
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was no irrelevant information, this is no longer the case: ρir(t1) 6= 0. Yet — we hope!
— nonetheless ρ(t1) is still forwards-compatible. Accordingly, the ‘Simple’ states are
a subset of the forwards-compatible states. Thus, given the microdynamics, imposing
such an initial condition is a sufficient but not necessary initial condition for ensuring
that ρ is forwards-compatible.12
Given that such an initial condition can only be applied once, when should we apply
it? Practising physicists apply it at the beginning of the time of interest, t0 (option 1).
But this leads to a problem akin to that facing Boltzmann’s combinatoric argument. By
parity of reasoning, this licences the construction of the C− dynamics prior to t0, and the
C− dynamics yields anti-thermodynamic trajectories prior to t0. Such parity problems
motivate the ‘Past Hypothesis’; in the Boltzmannian case that the initial macrostate
of the universe had a ‘low entropy’ (Albert, 2000, Ch. 4). Here, this parity problem
motivates Wallace (2011, p. 22) to apply the initial state assumption to the beginning of
the universe (option 2). An in-depth analysis of the Past Hypothesis —and the different
possible forms it could take cf. Wallace (2011)— is not possible here, but I can allay
one worry: provided Markovian approximation holds good, the choice between applying
this condition in the manner of physicists (option 1) and a Past Hypothesis (option 2)
will not lead to dramatic empirical differences.13
In summary: When the forwards-compatibility condition fulfilled, C+ dynamics gives
the same values for relevant ρr as the microdynamics. Not all densities ρ are forwards-
compatible and nor is any density forwards-compatible for all times: as shown by the
reversibility and recurrence objections respectively. When considering how to determine
whether a given ρ is forwards-compatible or not, one suggestion was that a probability
density will be forwards-compatible if it satisfies the initial state assumption at t0 (or in
Wallace’s terminology is ‘Simple’ at t0). However, whether t0 should be taken to be at
the beginning of time of interest (option 1) or the beginning of the universe (option 2)
is a contentious matter.
4 Anthropocentrism and illusion: two objections
If coarse-graining is empirically successful (as I have claimed) then perhaps no further
justification is required. This would be a tempting line to take, were it not for the
12The plausibility of such initial conditions on probabilities densities will depend on one’s interpreta-
tion of probability in SM. ‘Simplicity’ fits especially well with a Jaynesian account: Jaynesians interpret
ρ as encoding our ignorance of the system. If all we know is the system’s macrostate, then claiming
that ρ is uniform across this state ensures that ρ is Simple.
13The difference between t0 for options 1 and 2 is dramatic: 13.7 billion years. One might think
that this should lead to equally dramatic differences in the constructed equations, as t0 appears in
the premaster equation. And thus one might hope to adjudicate between options 1 and 2 on these
empirical grounds. But the key physical insight behind the Markovian approximation explains why
despite the dramatic difference between t0 for options 1 and 2, there need be an accompanying dramatic
empirical difference, as follows. Provided that the Markovian approximation holds good and —as is
uncontroversial— the recurrence time is much much greater than 13.7 million years, if we apply ρir = 0
at the beginning of the universe, there will not be 13.7 billion years’ worth of ‘irrelevant information’
(e.g. correlations encoded in ρir) that is liable to be about to become dynamically relevant for ρr
(and so causing empirical differences between option 1 or 2). The only potential difference will be the
information τ seconds ago. (See Zeh (2007, p. 64) for more details).
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literature’s containing a barrage of criticisms of coarse-graining. For example: coarse-
graining ‘seems repugnant to many authors’ (Uffink, 2010, p. 197) and is even claimed
to be ‘deceitful’ (Redhead, 1996, p. 31). The coarse-grained time-asymmetry is also
called ‘illusory’ (Prigogine, 1980) and potentially ‘subjective’ (Denbigh and Denbigh,
1985, p. 53).
This purported subjectivity of coarse-graining leads to concerns about the status of
the time-asymmetry. According to Davies, ‘it is indeed a matter of philosophy rather
than physics to decide if the coarse-grained asymmetry is ‘real’ or not’ (Davies, 1977,
p. 77). Furthermore, the potentially unusual or subjective status of the coarse-grained
asymmetry within physics leads Gru¨nbaum (1973) to discuss whether scientific realism
is incompatible with coarse-graining approaches in SM. More broadly, determining this
status of the asymmetry is part of a wider philosophical project of untangling ‘what
is genuinely an aspect of reality from what is a kind of appearance, or artifact, of the
particular perspective from which we regard reality’ (Price, 1996, p. 4).
Summing up, it seems to me that these objections can be divided into two camps:
(Illusory): First, the asymmetry is a mere artifact of coarse-graining and so is illusory.
(Anthropocentric): Secondly, it arises from our perspective and so is anthropocentric.
Given these concerns and objections, coarse-graining requires some conceptual, not just
empirical, justification. I propose that this task can be split into two:
(Choice): What is the justification for the choice of coarse-graining projection?
(At all): Why is it legitimate to coarse-grain at all?
A justification for coarse-graining may of course purport to answer both questions. And
the answers may be linked. For example, if the justification for the choice of coarse-
graining projection was deemed to be unacceptably subjective, then this might lead one
to believe that coarse-graining at all is unacceptable. However, the two issues can also
come apart. For example, a justification for coarse-graining might only motivate why it
is an acceptable procedure in general, but remain silent on how to choose a particular
coarse-graining projection.
In Section 4.2, I will consider and reject the ‘measurement imprecision’ justification and
discuss how it lies behind the (Illusory) and (Anthropocentric) objections: before giving,
in Section 5, my favoured justification. But first, I consider the two objections in more
detail — in Section 4.1.
4.1 The two objections in more detail
The claim that the coarse-grained asymmetry is an “illusion” (Prigogine, 1980): as cited
in Denbigh and Denbigh (1985, p. 56) is rooted in the action of Pˆ . The contention is
that Pˆ “distorts” ρ and the gap between ρ and ρr is the source of the coarse-grained
asymmetry. Every time we apply Pˆ we edge away from the correct density ρ — in
particular we edge away from the correct value of the Gibbs (fine-grained) entropy by
a certain amount: “the required increase in the coarse-grained entropy is obtained by
disregarding the dynamical constraints on the system” (Ridderbos, p. 66). By repeat-
edly coarse-graining (as is done in the C+ dynamics), we generate the coarse-grained
13
asymmetry. “The repeated coarse-graining operators appear to be added ‘by hand’, in
deviation from the true dynamical evolution provided by Ut” (Uffink, 2010, p. 197). That
is, the coarse-grained asymmetry exists merely in virtue of the continual coarse-graining
in the C+ dynamics — each coarse-graining increases Scg by some small amount so that
eventually an asymmetry is produced. “Perhaps most worrying, the irreversible be-
haviour of Scg arises almost solely due to the coarse-graining” (Callender, 1999, p. 360).
Thus, since the asymmetry stems from the infidelity of coarse-graining, it is illusory.
This (Illusory) objection has the following form:
• P1. The action of Pˆ is to deliberately distort the correct density ρ.
• P2. The asymmetry only arises from the repeated coarse-graining every ∆t in the
C+ dynamics.
• Conclusion: The coarse-grained asymmetry is an illusion.
Next I consider the (Anthropocentric) objection. According to this objection, the
coarse-grained asymmetry, in particular the coarse-grained entropy, is not an objec-
tive physical quantity, like energy or mass but rather is ‘agent-centric’. For example,
Wigner and Jaynes have called entropy ‘anthropocentric’ (Jaynes, 1965). The terms
‘subjectivity’ and ‘anthropocentrism’ are used interchangeably in this debate. Den-
bigh and Denbigh (1985) helpfully distinguish two kinds of objectivity (and thereby of
subjectivity). Objectivity1 is intersubjective agreement. Objectivity2 is stronger. It
requires the phenomena in question to be independent of human cognition. In the de-
bate about coarse-graining, intersubjective disagreement is not the issue. Rather it is
the second kind of subjectivity (¬Objectivity2) that is at stake, which I earlier dubbed
‘anthropocentrism’.
The reason for this charge of anthropocentrism is as follows. In the case of the archetypal
Gibbsian coarse-graining Pˆcg the size of the boxes is chosen by us. “There are no laws
of physics which determine the size of the [cells]” (Denbigh and Denbigh, 1985, p. 51):
merely our preference determines the choice. Furthermore, “the increase of entropy and
the approach to equilibrium would thus apparently be a consequence of the fact that
we shake up the probability density repeatedly in order to wash away all information
about the past, while refusing a dynamical explanation for this procedure” (Uffink, 2010,
p. 196). In addition, the partition is chosen by us: “the occurrence and direction of a
temporal change of the entropy... depends essentially on our human choice of the size
of the finite equal cells of boxes into which we partition... phase space ” (Gru¨nbaum,
1973, p. 647, emphasis in original). The objection extends to all instances of Pˆ ; “a
Zwanzig projection (describing generalized coarse-graining) can be arbitrarily chosen
for convenience” (Zeh, 2007, p. 67).
Gru¨nbaum (1973) points out that the charge of anthropocentrism here differs from the
more general claim that scientific theories are human constructs. It seems that the
Standard Model could describe the world, even if there were no (human) observers. Yet,
according to the Anthropocentric critique, this would not be the case for entropy, and
the coarse-grained description.
Lying behind these objections is a particular justification of coarse-graining: the mea-
surement imprecision (MI) justification: to which I now turn.
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4.2 Against the justification by measurement imprecision (MI)
In the literature, the most common justification for coarse-graining is that our measure-
ments have limited precision. “The coarse-graining approach makes essential use of the
observation that we only have access to measurements of finite resolution” (Ridderbos,
2002, p. 66). Thus, we can never locate a system precisely in phase space; we only know
p and q to a certain degree of accuracy. The cells over which we average with the Pˆcg for
the archetypal Gibbsian coarse-graining have a size which corresponds to “the limits of
accuracy actually available to us” (Tolman, 1938, p. 167). Because we could never, ex
hypothesi, measure the system accurately enough, we are unable to distinguish between
the coarse and fine-grained distributions ρ and ρr. Thus, according to this measure-
ment imprecision (MI) justification, the answer to (Choice) is that we must pick the
coarse-graining Pˆ that matches our observational capacities. For those coarse-grainings
Pˆ whose selection is justified by the indistinguishability between ρ and ρr, the MI jus-
tification also answers why (for those particular projections) coarse-graining (At all) is
justified — because we cannot tell the difference.
Appealing to appearances originates from Gibbs’ ink analogy. Whilst the ink drop’s
volume is constant, it fibrillates throughout the water, and so it appears to us to be
uniformly distributed. Our limited powers of observation cannot distinguish between
the fibrillated case and the locally uniform distribution resulting from coarse-graining.
A similar argument arises in the Boltzmannian approach to SM, where phase space is
partitioned into ‘macrostates’. Every microstate corresponds to one macrostate. A par-
ticular macrostate is defined by values of macrovariables, such as volume, temperature
and pressure. These macrostates are sets of microstates that are ‘empirically indistin-
guishable’. Thus, an appeal is once again made to our observational capacities.14
The (Illusory) and (Anthropocentric) objections arise from this justification of coarse-
graining (rather than coarse-graining itself). The claim that the coarse-grained asym-
metry is illusory is bolstered by the MI justification, since it implies that if we were to be
able to measure the system more precisely (in the idiom of Gibbs’ analogy to see the thin
fibrillating tubes of ink rather than the smooth spreading) then the asymmetry would
disappear. The coarse-grained asymmetry would thus be an illusion stemming from the
imprecision of our measuring devices. The claim that the asymmetry is anthropocentric
is also underwritten by the MI justification. If the coarse-grained ρ distribution is indis-
tinguishable from the fine-grained ρ distribution to us and thus the choice of Pˆ depends
our capabilities, then the asymmetry would be anthropocentric.
However, the MI justification is unsatisfactory. This is not (only) because it leads to
the illusion and anthropocentric objections, but also, even on its own terms: it is both
insufficient and unnecessary for justifying coarse-graining. (However, other purposes for
which measurement imprecision may be important will be briefly discussed in Sections
7 and 8.1).
The imprecision of our measurements is not a sufficient justification for implementing
a coarse-graining projection Pˆ , since choosing a projection that fits with the limits of
observation will not always lead to autonomous irreversible dynamics of the type given
by the ZZW framework. “Observability of the macroscopic variables is not sufficient...
14But the Boltzmannian partition is not necessarily the same as the Gibbsian cells.
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It is conceivable (and occurs in practice) that a particular partition in terms of observ-
able quantities does not lead to a Markov process” (Uffink, 2010, p. 196). That is, a
coarse-graining could reflect our measurement precision but not lead to an example of
useful dynamics: in particular, to autonomous C+ dynamics. Therefore, measurement
imprecision is not sufficient for answering (Choice).
Furthermore, appealing to measurement imprecision is not necessary for explaining why
we should choose any particular coarse-graining Pˆ . If it were, we would in every case
have to ascertain the imprecision of particular measuring devices and accordingly choose
a coarse-graining Pˆ . Yet, in Section 2, this is not how coarse-graining projections were
chosen; and the details of particular measuring devices (or the resolution of our eyes) are
in fact never used in constructing equations in the ZZW framework. It seems unlikely
that advances in the science of microscopy will lead to different choices of Pˆ .15
Thus appealing to the limited precision of our measurement devices is incapable of
justifying the choice of coarse-graining projections (Choice). The MI justification only
answers (At all) in virtue of answering (Choice) in particular cases, and thus its failure
to answer to (Choice) means that it automatically does not answer (At all). With MI
thus rebutted, I now outline my proposed alternative justification.
5 An alternative justification
Applying Pˆ throws away details. Why would throwing away details ever be a good
move? One motivation for moving to the coarse-grained description is that modelling
the evolution of ρ under the Liouvillean dynamics is computationally intractable, because
solving the equations of motion for some 1023 particles is infeasible.
Were this the only motivation for coarse-graining, one might be misled into believing
that in an ideal world where we were equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer
and the initial states of each of 1023 particles, the coarse-grained description would be
dispensed with. Yet something would be lost, if upon receiving all the information
and extraordinarily powerful computers, we ditched the discipline of SM: and this re-
veals a general point about the assumptions in SM. Namely: as I argue in Section 5.1,
computational intractability is not the only motivation for such approximations and
assumptions. In Section 5.1, I distinguish between Galilean idealisation and abstrac-
tion, and then classify coarse-graining as abstraction to a higher level of description.
This, plus the desideratum that the dynamics at this level be autonomous, allow me to
justify coarse-graining. Then, in Section 5.2, I illustrate these ideas of abstraction and
autonomy with the Game of Life.
15My rebuttal of the necessity of the MI justification takes its proponents at their word. But perhaps
this is uncharitable, for in reality, typical discussions of the construction of autonomous equations are
often schematic— they merely assume there is such a projector that satisfies the required assumptions,
without a detailed demonstrations that the projector does indeed fulfil these assumptions. As I have
not investigated such demonstrations, it is an open question whether for that project —rather than the
construction of autonomous dynamics— measurement imprecision is necessary.
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5.1 Abstraction and autonomy
There are two reasons that such leaps in our computational capacity would not make
SM ‘superfluous’. Firstly, it is unclear in what sense solving some 1023 coupled equations
would constitute an explanation of the behaviour of the gas.16 Secondly, a statistical me-
chanical system such as a gas “exhibit[s] perfectly definite regularities in its behaviour”
(Tolman, 1938, p. 2). Such regularities would be lost amongst the morass of detail at
the fundamental (or lower) level. This difference in levels of description is particularly
vivid in the case of coarse-graining; by moving to the lower-level Liouvillean dynamics,
we not only lose explanatory power but also some very useful equations that determine
transport coefficients and relaxation times.
At this point, we need to distinguish different strategies for simplifying scientific de-
scriptions. This is a large topic and the words at issue —idealisation, abstraction and
approximation— are terms of art that different authors construe differently, but I will
crudely categorise strategies as Galilean idealisations or abstractions. A Galilean ideali-
sation introduces ‘deliberate distortions’ (Frigg and Hartmann, 2006), familiar from the
standard examples of frictionless planes and perfectly rational economic agents. A com-
mon way to think about such idealisations is by analogy to a perturbative series. The
behaviour of the target system is veridically described by the full series, but a successful
idealised description is akin to the first term of the series. Adding the higher-order terms
renders the idealised description more accurate and furthermore, explains the success of
the idealisation even if these terms are not actually calculated (Batterman, 2009, p. 17).
Often Galilean idealisations are used in order to render a problem more tractable —
and in an ideal world, we would remove the idealisation (and so add all the terms of the
series in) — and this would lead to a more accurate representation.17
In contrast, I take abstraction to be the omission, or throwing away, of certain pieces of
information (Knox, 2016; Thomson-Jones, 2005). This corresponds to a broad category
in the literature: Weisberg (2007)’s minimal modelling, Cartwright’s abstraction and
Aristotelian idealisation (Frigg and Hartmann, 2006). This category involves ‘throwing
away details, stripping away, keeping only the core causal factors’.18
Thus I claim: coarse-graining is not a Galilean idealisation. If it were, there would be
certain details those inclusion would improve the coarse-grained description. Yet, in the
ZZW framework, this is not so. Indeed, we know exactly which details would need to
be added to render a more complete description — the information about the irrelevant
degrees of freedom that we threw away! But clearly if we were to add ρir back in, we
would no longer have the coarse-grained, and useful, equations found in Section 2.
Instead, coarse-graining is abstraction. ρr omits irrelevant information, which has been
discarded by Pˆ . For instance, in the archetypal Gibbsian case, the action of the coarse-
16Some might argue that whilst the solution of the 1023 equations might not be the best explanation,
it is nonetheless an explanation. However, the details of the vast debate about explanation are not
needed for what follows.
17In Weisberg’s terminology, the ‘representation ideal’ would be to remove the idealisation (Weisberg,
2007, p. 642).
18Of course, there are other categorisations - e.g. McMullin (1985) has six types of idealisation.
Norton (2012) discusses approximation and idealisation in a different sense. Notably, different Pˆ s
might be (sub)-categorised differently according to a more fine-grained classification. However, all that
matters here is that coarse-graining is not a Galilean idealisation.
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graining projection Pˆcg is to omit exactly how the probability varies across the coarse-
graining cell as only the probability of the entire cell is relevant: “how full the cell is,
rather than how it is filled”. Some projections take a density in a given equivalence class
to be an exemplar of that class (Wallace, 2011, p. 9). In such cases, only the fact that
the density is in the equivalence class is relevant, not which member of the class it is.
In the case of Pˆµ, information about the correlations between particles is omitted.
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Thus ρr is a new variable germane to this higher-level of description implicitly defined
by a given Pˆ : rather than a distorted replacement of ρ, which is how an idealisation
conception of coarse-graining would interpret ρr. As ρr forms part of a higher-level
of description it need not be in tension with ρ, just as descriptions in biology need
not be in tension with descriptions in psychology. ρr is not an ‘idealised’ version of ρ
containing false elements, as omission need not get in the way of telling a true causal
story (Strevens, 2008; Lewis, 1986). Thus, coarse-graining at all is justified because it
allows us to abstract to a higher-level of description. This is my proposed answer to
Section 4’s (At all).
Pˆ abstracts to a higher level of description. Yet we don’t just want to abstract to a
higher level: we want a theory of the goings-on at this level. For example, suppose Pˆcam
coarse-grains the position and mass distribution of people in Cambridge to the centre of
mass of this population. The information about the masses and locations of individuals
has been thrown away, leaving a more abstract description of the population. However,
discussing the centre of mass of Cambridge’s population is not going to be useful, if the
only way to find out how this centre of mass moves is to consider the movement of all
the individuals and then re-average. If we cannot say anything about what is going on
a higher level of description without invoking information from the lower level, then the
higher level of description is not going to be useful.20
But not having to refer to the lower-level details in describing the goings-on at the higher
level of description is precisely what the autonomy condition in the ZZW framework
captures. Recall that the dynamics are autonomous if they were of the form f(ρr)
rather f(ρr, ρir); the dynamics for the relevant degrees of freedom have no functional
dependence on ρir. In other words, ρir is not a ‘difference-maker’ for the evolution of
ρr (Woodward, 2005; Strevens, 2008, Ch. 3). Note, however, that whilst the idea of
different descriptions is contained in the concept of autonomy, no notion of hierarchy is
implied. There could be different descriptions without one being ‘higher’ than another
(cf. List and Pivato (2015, p. 150, fn. 41). Thus the ‘higher-level’ aspect of this
justification comes from taking Pˆ as abstracting from irrelevant details. The terminology
of ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ degrees of freedom is highly appropriate; for if the dynamics
weren’t autonomous then the so-called ‘irrelevant’ details would indeed be relevant.
Now, by taking this cue from the ZZW framework, it is clear what justifies the choice of
19Of course, adding in some correlations (i.e. adding in the third tier of the BBGKY hierarchy) may
lead to a more empirically successful autonomous equation than the autonomous equation describing
the evolution of the one-particle marginal density. Indeed, e.g. doing so can provide corrections to the
Boltzmann equation. But of course, we wouldn’t want to add in all the correlations in the BBGKY
hierarchy — in the limit, doing so would take us back to the reversible dynamics. And indeed, truncation
at first or second equations in the hierarchy is the key benefit of the BBGKY approach — it is useful
because we can get away with only considering the lower hierarchy.
20List and Pivato (2015, p. 135) go further. In their framework, the lower-level language is by
definition unavailable at the higher level.
18
any particular coarse-graining map. Whilst any coarse-graining map can be used to find
a pre-master equation, not every Pˆ will lead to coarse-grained irreversible dynamics.
Only those coarse-grainings of a system that satisfy the two conditions (in Stage 3 of
Section 2) will lead to autonomous dynamics.21 Thus, the choice of coarse-graining
map is determined by whether it results in successful C+ dynamics. I agree that this
criterion will not help physicists discover new, useful maps. The class of successful Pˆ s
will not look especially unified. But this is to be expected; each case requires details
of the particular system at hand. Thus as Uffink (2010, p.195) says: “it is ‘the art of
the physicist’ to find the right choice, an art in which he or she succeeds in practice by
a mixture of general principles and ingenuity, but where no general guidelines can be
provided”.22
To summarise, this alternative justification answers Section 4’s two justificatory ques-
tions as follows:
? (Choice) - The choice of a particular map is determined by the desideratum of
finding autonomous dynamics.
? (At all) - Applying a map Pˆ abstracts to a higher level of description.
5.2 An illustration: the Game of Life
The key ideas of autonomy and abstraction are vividly illustrated by Conway’s Game
of Life: a standard example of the complexity science, and emergence, literature (see
e.g. Bedau and Humphreys (2008, Ch. 8,9,11,16,17)). The Game of Life is a cellular
automaton that operates via a simple rule: at each time-step, whether a cell of the Grid
is ON or OFF is determined by how many of its eight neighbours are ON. Despite the
extreme simplicity of the dynamical rule, a rich variety of patterns can evolve in the grid.
These stable shapes have characteristic movements and so are given vivid names: glider
guns spawn gliders moving across the grid, eaters destroy other shapes they ‘encroach’
on, and puffer trains move across the grid leaving behind debris in their wake — to
name but a few. Whilst the sheer variety of the Game of Life cannot be easily conveyed
in words (and is best appreciated by viewing a video of the evolution of a Life Grid), to
give an idea of the complexity that can arise: the Universal Turing machine has been
constructed in the Life Grid (Poundstone, 2013, p. 213).
When discussing the Life Grid, we can abstract to a higher level of description and, as
done above, describe the goings-on in terms of the menagerie of ‘gliders’ and ‘blinkers’
rather than in terms of the cells. For example, the glider moves across the grid with
velocity c/4, where c is the ‘speed of light’ (in the sense of being the ‘speed limit’ — this
maximum speed is one cell per unit time). This alternative description of gliders “has
its own language, a transparent foreshortening of the tedious descriptions one could give
at the physical level” (Dennett, 1991, p. 39). Discussing the gliders’ motion in this way
21Autonomy in the sense of ‘not referring to ρir’ is achieved by the initial state assumption. But for
autonomy in the sense of not depending at all on t, the Markovian approximation needs to be satisfied.
22Of course, in individual cases, there will be the further explanatory project of showing that the two
required assumptions are satisfied by a chosen Pˆ — and this will give us further insight into why in
these particular cases autonomous dynamics are possible, i.e. why our desideratum is fulfilled. But as
a general answer to (Choice) — the only rationale for picking any Pˆ is that it leads to an autonomous
dynamics.
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is predictively successful. Furthermore, often these descriptions are autonomous: we
need not keep referring back to the lower-level, i.e. cell-level, details.23 But, of course,
theoretically we could have calculated the evolution of the grid at the cell-level and then,
at the end, abstracted to the higher-level, e.g. glider-level, of description. Thus, as in
the ZZW framework, there are two routes to predictions about later times: cf. Figure
2.
In both cases —ascending to the glider level of description from the cell level of descrip-
tion and ascending to a coarse-grained level of description (ρr) from the fine-grained
description (ρ)— new and surprising features emerge.24 In the Game of Life at the
glider-level of description, there is ‘motion’. At the cell-level there is no motion. Likewise
in SM: at the coarse-grained higher-level of description, many features are different. The
coarse-grained probability density ρr, the C
+ dynamics and the coarse-grained entropy
Scg are very different from their fine-grained counterparts: the fine-grained distribution
ρ, the microdynamics, U(t), and the fine-grained entropy, Sfg. In the paradigmatic case
of N particles in a box, the two descriptions give different answers regarding whether the
dynamics is reversible or not: in particular, about whether the Gibbs entropy increases
over a period of time or not.
Admittedly, there are differences: in the SM case, there are no patterns that can be ‘seen
at a snapshot’. And because SM describes the evolution of probability densities there is
no clear ontology at the higher-level description like Life’s menagerie.25 The pattern is
the non-decreasing value of a particular quantity: the coarse-grained entropy, Scg. This
is not a synchronic pattern but a dynamical pattern. Furthermore, unlike the Game of
Life case this is not a visual pattern. However, patterns at higher levels of description
need not be “visual patterns but, one might say, intellectual patterns” that are “there
for the picking up if only we are lucky or clever enough to hit on the right perspective”
(Dennett, 1991, p. 41).
Yet, this in no way undermines its credentials as a pattern. One criterion for a higher-
level pattern is predictive success: and betting that the coarse-grained entropy associated
to an irreversible process will increase is a safe bet. Consequently, there ‘are macroscopic
patterns running through those very microscopic interactions’ (O’Connor and Wong,
2015, 1.4) in both the SM and Game of Life cases.
To summarise: the important consequence of coarse-graining, i.e. of abstracting, is
that autonomous dynamical patterns —structural features— once obscured by irrelevant
details are revealed. Equipped with this alternative justification, I can now give a reply
to the (Illusory) objection in Section 6; and to the (Anthropocentric) objection (in
Section 7).
23This is akin to autonomy in the SM case, although not literally as there are no differential equations.
24Of course, in both cases, finding these features will depend sensitively on how the higher-level
variables are defined, i.e. on how we abstract: cf. Knox (2016, p. 45).
25Note, also, that Life differs in another way: the patterns in Life are noise-intolerant — ‘debris’ can
easily destroy the menagerie.
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Figure 3: Route 1: to find the coarse-grained distribution ρr at any given time, evolve the full-
distribution under the microdynamics U(t) until this time and then apply the coarse-graining map
Pˆ .
Figure 4: Route 2: to find the coarse-grained distribution ρr at any given time, evolve ρr under the
C+ dynamics until that time. Recall the C+ dynamics is composed of applying U for ∆t, applying Pˆ ,
applying U for ∆t.., where ∆t is much smaller than t1 − t0.
6 Reply to (Illusory)
Recall that two premises were required to establish the conclusion that the asymmetry is
illusory. According to the (Illusory) objector’s P1: coarse-graining distorts the correct
density ρ. Furthermore, the coarse-grained asymmetry exists merely in virtue of the
repeated coarse-graining every ∆t in the C+ dynamics (P2). Thus, as the asymmetry is
rooted in the infidelity of coarse-graining, it is illusory.
The immediate reply to (Illusory) is surely — the irreversible equations of SM are
empirically adequate. If the asymmetry were illusory then we could not expect such
success. Whilst this removes much of the force behind (Illusory), the illusory objector
might deny our assumption of empirical adequacy. In any case, in this Section I argue
that P2 is false and this refutes (Illusory). Furthermore, the considerations of Section
5 reveal that P1 is also false.
Contra to P2, the asymmetry is not generated merely in virtue of the continual coarse-
graining — provided that the forwards-compatibility condition is met, the asymmetry
is robust with respect to the number of applications of Pˆ . Even if we eschew the C+
dynamics, we could determine ρr at particular times t1, tn by evolving ρ under the
microdynamics then projecting up to ρr at tn. Call this route 1 (as shown in Figure
3, a version of the forwards-compatibility diagram in Section 3.1). Taking route 1,
we would still find that the coarse-grained variables, ρr increase in entropy toward the
future; S(ρr(t0)) 6 S(ρr(t1)) 6 S(ρr(t2)). As such, we find an asymmetric pattern in ρr
without using the C+ dynamics. Thus, the asymmetry is not solely due to the repeated
coarse-graining in the C+ dynamics and so, P2 is false.
P1 claims that the action of Pˆ is to deliberately distort the correct density. That is,
coarse-graining is a Galilean idealisation. On such a conception, ρr and ρ are analo-
gous to the first term and full series respectively. According to (Illusory), neglecting
these higher-order terms is the source of the asymmetry. However, Section 5 revealed
that coarse-graining is not a Galilean idealisation but rather an abstraction. ρr is not
a distorted replacement but a new variable germane to a higher-level of description.
Consequently, P1 is false.
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Ultimately, however, the falsity of P2 is key to rebutting (Illusory). The forwards-
compatibility condition shows that the irrelevant degrees of freedom do not matter as
they do not influence the evolution of the relevant degrees of freedom; they are not
‘difference makers’. As such, the coarse-grained asymmetry would be robust — even if
coarse-graining were a Galilean idealisation.
7 Reply to (Anthropocentric)
The anthropocentric objection is that no law determines the size of the cells and so we
have a choice over which Pˆ to pick, and thus the coarse-grained quantities such as Scg
are anthropocentric. The concern was that this marks SM out as a theory worryingly
different from the rest of physics.
However, my proposed alternative justification (Section 5.1) claims that the choice of
coarse-graining map depends upon whether it uncovers successful autonomous dynamics,
not our limited capacities. Thus it is not that we have a choice over which Pˆ to pick
(and consequently the resulting equations and Scg are ‘tainted’ by anthropocentrism).
Rather it is a matter of whether ρr and ρir dynamically decouple and “we are lucky
or clever enough to hit on the perspective” — Pˆ — that reveals the patterns that are
“there for the picking up” (Dennett, 1991, p. 41). There is no freedom in the choice that
makes it depend upon our cognition (in a way that differs from the rest of the scientific
enterprise). Only for particular choices of Pˆ is there an autonomous dynamics — the
choice needs to be “just right” (Uffink, 2010, p. 195). And this situation is not special.
Like countless moves in physics —in particular, countless definitions of good variables—
the use is justified by its success: where here ‘success’ means that autonomous dynamics
are found.
Consequently, coarse-grained features need not be anthropocentric in a way different
from other physical quantities and so in this matter, SM has the same status as any other
scientific theory. Hence, coarse-graining does not lead to a specific anthropocentrism
(which one might have been concerned would render SM incompatible with scientific
realism).
However, as discussed in Section 5, different levels of description are useful for differ-
ent purposes and what is deemed useful may be relative to our human interests. Here
our measuring capacities and imprecision are certainly relevant. Were we the size of a
Maxwell demon and endowed with an ability to manipulate gas molecules, violations of
the second law of thermodynamics might be expected. From their microscopic perspec-
tive, the second law might not seem like an obvious regularity in nature.
In addition, which patterns are uncovered might depend upon our limited human ca-
pacities — whether we can ‘hit on the right perspective’. For instance, there may be
regularities in the movement of the centre of mass of Cambridge’s population, but our
cognitive abilities may make us unable to pick up these patterns. Which variables we
find useful depends on which variables we can access, i.e. measure and manipulate.
Thus, our measuring capacities will clearly influence the construction and confirmation
of our scientific theories. But — crucially — the details of our measuring limitations
are not needed to justify coarse-graining in SM.
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The above considerations highlight a potential general anthropocentrism: our scientific
theories may be irrevocably entwined with our cognitive abilities and pragmatic interests.
But this is not the return of the earlier (Anthropocentric) objection, which was specific:
that the coarse-grained features are anthropocentric in a way that differs from the other
putative physical quantities. The alternative justification shows that coarse-graining
need not mark out SM as subjective and so different from other theories, but this
conclusion is nonetheless compatible with scientific theories in general containing some
element of anthropocentrism.
8 The wider landscape: concluding remarks
In Section 4, one of the concerns about coarse-graining was whether the coarse-grained
asymmetry is ‘real’ or not. Recall that Davies claims that this was “a matter of philoso-
phy”; and indeed, in Section 8.1 I explain why this is so: briefly, whether the asymmetry
is real or not depends on one’s views about inter-theoretic relations. Then in Section
8.2, I consider what my proposed justification reveals about the nature of irreversibility
in SM.
8.1 Inter-theoretic relations
To some extent, the ZZW framework provides a case study in inter-theoretic relations;
SM is a distinct, higher-level theory from either of classical mechanics (CM) or quantum
mechanics (QM). In the wider literature on inter-theoretic relations, one key issue is
the nature of the connections between the different levels. For instance, biology and
psychology could be disunified descriptions operating at different levels of generality:
in addition to not being ‘reducible-in-practice’, they could even be not reducible-in-
principle (Bedau and Humphreys, 2008, p. 215). That is, there may be disunity between
the psychological and biological levels of description. Cartwright (1999), for example,
advocates such a patchwork view of the scientific enterprise.
Different philosophical accounts of reduction make different requirements on the notion,
and some are more stringent than others. (For instance, there is debate about whether
any bridge laws invoked by the reduction must ensure the lower-level theory explains the
higher-level theory). I will leave aside the details of different accounts of reduction, since
I think that independently of any given account of reduction: this is a case of reduction-
in-practice. After all, the ZZW framework allows us to construct the equations of one
theory (SM) from another (CM or QM).
But there is a further issue concerning inter-theoretic relations: what attitude should one
have to the higher-level entities — realism or instrumentalism? Hence, as Davies says,
whether one believes the coarse-grained asymmetry is ‘real’ is a matter of philosophy; it
depends on your prior philosophical convictions about higher-level entities in the special
sciences.
Furthermore, such philosophical convictions may also have a general impact on one’s
views about the nature of the asymmetry. Had the MI justification been the best justifi-
cation of coarse-graining, then the coarse-grained asymmetry would have been revealed
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to be inescapably subjective or anthropocentric. Whilst I hope to have established (in
Sections 6 and 7) that one is not compelled to consider the asymmetry to be anthro-
pocentric, motivated by general themes in inter-theoretic relations, one might still want
to conclude that it is, in fact, anthropocentric. For example, an instrumentalist about
higher-level theories might maintain that the instrumental value of these descriptions is
inextricably bound up with our measuring and cognitive capacities and thus, all higher-
level entities are anthropocentric. The key message of this paper is that the justification
of coarse-graining need not mark SM out from other scientific theories for that discussion
(as we saw in Section 7).
Next, there is a final philosophical issue about the nature of the coarse-grained asym-
metry to discuss: its emergent nature.
8.2 The nature of irreversibility
Finally, I turn to irreversibility. As a foil for this discussion, I choose a passage from
Sklar (1993), which puts very well a general doubt: whether a strategy such as the one
outlined in this paper, can really succeed in reconciling the time-symmetry of micro-
processes with the asymmetry of macro-processes.
“Do the procedures for deriving kinetic equations and the approach to equi-
librium really generate fundamentally time-asymmetric results?” (Sklar,
1993, p. 217, emphasis added).
However, contra to Sklar’s phrasing, the ZZW construction method does not generate
a fundamental time-asymmetry. The coarse-grained asymmetry is a feature of a higher-
level description. Higher-level descriptions can have features that differ substantially
from the lower-level descriptions (without there being a contradiction). Often these
features are described as emergent.
Agreed, ‘emergence’ is a murky word and is used in many different ways (see Silberstein
(2002) for a survey). Very roughly, emergent entities or processes ‘arise’ out of more
fundamental entities or processes and yet have ‘distinctive’ features in their own right.
It is contentious what the ‘distinctive’ features are: proposals in the literature include
‘novelty’ (Butterfield, 2011, p. 1065) and being ‘unexpected’ (Chalmers, 2006, p. 244).26
Furthermore, how substantively a phrase such as ‘in their own right’ must be read also
varies across authors — some maintain that emergence is the failure of reduction whilst
others (e.g. Butterfield (2011)) deny this. The menagerie of the Game of Life, such
as gliders and blinkers, are often cited as key examples of emergent entities that have
certain emergent properties and evolve under certain emergent processes (Bedau and
Humphreys, 2008).
The sense in which I use ‘emergent’ is mild; it is merely that there is ‘novel and ro-
bust behaviour with respect to some comparison class’ (Butterfield, 2011, p. 1065).
26Both of these examples are definitions of ‘weak emergence’ (a use of the word ‘emergence’ popular
with scientists and philosophers of physics) as opposed to the philosopher’s ‘strong emergence’, which is
a logically stronger notion. Although authors vary about exactly what the distinction between weak and
strong emergence is, the idea is that this stronger sense implies a lack of reduction or supervenience of
the emergent phenomenon on the lower level. See Chalmers (2006) for more detail on the weak/strong
distinction.
24
(Butterfield’s account is especially apt for this case, since he shows his definition to be
compatible with (Nagelian) inter-theoretic reduction, and as discussed above, the ZZW
construction is a case of reduction).
Of course, as mentioned above, there are many accounts of emergence that one could
favour. An alternative account that might seem apt here is Wilson (2009). Her key
idea is that some phenomena are “weakly ontologically emergent from physical phe-
nomena” (Wilson, 2009, p. 280) when some degrees of freedom are eliminated. Note
that eliminating functional dependence of one set of degrees of freedom from another
was exactly the autonomy condition of the ZZW framework. Furthermore, her accounts
fits well with the general topic of abstraction and talk of levels of description (such as
that made precise by List and Pivato (2015)). However, Wilson’s focus is on weakly
emergent entities and as mentioned at the end of Section 5.2, one of the disanalogies
with the Game of life is that is unclear in our case what the candidate emergent en-
tities would be. Moreover, Wilson’s aim is defend non-reductive physicalism, which is
contentious. Thus, I will not pursue Wilson’s account further here. Instead: I submit
that the broad gist of Butterfield’s account captures the main intuition common to all
accounts of ‘emergent phenomena’: robust, because a putative case of emergence must
not be too flimsy in order to count as a bona fide phenomenon and novel, in order to
earn the name ‘emergent’.
Thus, my response to Sklar’s concerns above is as follows: the irreversibility generated
by these methods is not fundamental but emergent. Irreversibility emerges when one ab-
stracts from the fine-grained level of description to the coarse-grained level of description
by applying a Pˆ that leads to autonomous dynamics.
Note finally that this mild conclusion that the coarse-grained asymmetry is weakly
emergent is not “toothless”. It is in direct opposition to Prigogine and Stengers (1984,
p. 285) who claim: “Irreversibility is either true on all levels or on none: it cannot
emerge as if out of nothing, on going from one level to another”. Whilst the lower-level
dynamics is reversible, the coarse-grained dynamics at the higher level of description
is irreversible. True, this emergent irreversibility does not arise “as if out of nothing”.
Time-asymmetric assumptions were required when constructing the C+ dynamics (and
when ruling out the C− dynamics) in Section 2. But this is to be expected; if no
asymmetry is put in, then we cannot expect asymmetry out.27
To sum up: the ZZW framework constructs the irreversible equations of SM from the un-
derlying reversible microdynamics: thus, reconciling the higher-level asymmetry with the
27Since the time-asymmetry is not fundamental and was “put in by hand” (as discussed earlier),
this project won’t satisfy those seeking to locate the source of time-asymmetry. To the extent that this
project answers that question, it claims the asymmetry arises because of particular initial conditions (the
initial state assumption). Some want an explanation of such initial conditions, especially when in the
guise of a ‘Past Hypothesis’ (cf. Callender (2004); Price (2004)), especially since such initial constraints
seem ad hoc or unnatural from “the mechanical world-view” (Sklar, 1993, p. 368). Moreover, there
is a debate over whether such an initial state is a law or a ‘de facto’ condition (Reichenbach, 1991;
Gru¨nbaum, 1973; Sklar, 1993, p. 370). Some such as Krylov (1979), are unhappy with the centrality
of such initial conditions in explaining irreversibility. But I believe my conclusion about the emergent
nature of the asymmetry helps us to see which explanatory projects are likely to be fruitful. In particular,
my conclusion eases the worry that the initial conditions required do not look especially natural nor
form a unified class. Because these higher-level patterns are weakly emergent, they are unexpected from
the lower-level mechanical perspective. Thus, the moves required at the lower-level in constructing SM
equations may often look unnatural: otherwise the higher-level pattern would have been expected.
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lower-level symmetry. The procedure of coarse-graining — key to this reconciliation but
thought to be suspicious by many — was justified provided that coarse-graining allows
us to abstract to a higher-level autonomous description (in a manner illustrated by the
Game of Life). I used my justification of coarse-graining to show that the coarse-grained
asymmetry is neither illusory nor anthropocentric, but instead: weakly emergent.
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